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Proponents tout the positive incentive-to-innovate effects of intellectual property rights 
(IPRs), while others maintain that the expanding subject matter and geographical extent of 
IPRs are stifling crop research, especially research and development (R&D) dealing with 
developing-country crop concerns.  Much of this debate relies on anecdotes and misleading 
or incomplete evidence on the extent and nature of the IPRs pertaining to crop technologies, 
including the jurisdictional extent of the property rights and their practice.  In this paper we 
review the evidence on the scope of agricultural R&D worldwide, provide new data on the 
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Creating, Protecting, and Using Crop Biotechnologies  
Worldwide in an Era of Intellectual Property 
 
1.  Introduction 
Most crops are grown in places where they did not occur naturally—they were introduced, 
either incidentally or intentionally. In this way the development and dissemination 
internationally of new and improved seed varieties has been the basis for productivity 
improvement in agriculture since crops were first domesticated about 10 millennia ago. 
Initially the movement of plant material involved farmers carrying seed as they migrated to 
new areas. Columbus returned from his voyage to the New World in the latter part of the 
15
th century laden with new plants that ushered in an extended era of state-sponsored 
expeditions to gather and evaluate plant materials the world over. For most of that time, 
new crop varieties were largely treated as common property, shared freely among farmers 
and countries and generating billions of dollars of benefits worldwide.
1  
The era of free and unencumbered access to new crop varieties appears to be 
passing. This has implications beyond the movement and marketing of new crop varieties; 
it affects their creation as well. Scientific crop breeding, drawing on rediscovered 
Mendelian Laws of Heredity, began in earnest about a century ago. For many countries, 
varietal innovations continue to rely heavily on introduced germplasm, making the 
                                                 
1 While personal or corporate intellectual property rights for plant biotechnology are recent phenomena within 
most countries, attempts at asserting national property rights over breeding materials internationally are 
nothing new (Boettiger et al. 2003). Monopolization of valuable markets has long been accomplished by 
nation-states prohibiting access to breeding materials. Examples include the Dutch monopolization of the 
European tea supply (Juma 1989), the Italian prohibition on rice seed export famously violated by Thomas 
Jefferson (Fowler 1994; Root and de Rochemont 1976), and more recently Ethiopia’s ban on the export of 
some coffee tree varieties (Fowler and Mooney 1990). These cases are, however, atypical; in general, 
traders, collectors, and breeders have had free access to landraces and farmers’ varieties from around the 
world. For a review of the evidence on the benefits arising from crop-improvement research, see Alston et 
al. (2000).   2 
international spillovers of germplasm, breeding techniques, and know-how integral to these 
crop improvement efforts. While substantial germplasm (much in the form of landraces and 
other primary plant materials) flowed from poorer countries into the rich ones, so too did 
enhanced germplasm subsequently move back to the poorer parts of the world. This reverse 
flow appears to have accelerated as the Green Revolution took hold, beginning in the 
1960s, as developing-country farmers took up improved varieties in a big way and as local 
breeding efforts screened and adapted these varietal spillins to better deal with local 
agroecological realities and production constraints.  
Throughout all these changes, crop improvement has been, and largely remains, a 
cumulative or sequential innovation process—new varieties build directly on the selection 
and breeding efforts of farmers and scientists of yesteryear. A new twist has come with the 
advent of modern biotechnology tools. Now the genetic makeup of new varieties are 
altered by the “conventional or classical” genetic manipulation techniques practiced 
formally by scientists for the past 100 years (and less formally by farmers for eons prior to 
that), or by bioengineered techniques involving the purposeful insertion of gene fragments 
into plants from other plants or other organisms using genomic and transformation 
technologies developed within the past two decades.
2 Like the crop varieties themselves, 
the tools of crop manipulation are increasingly encumbered by intellectual property, 
                                                 
2 All crops are genetically modified, making the mnemonic “GMOs” misleading in ways that seem to have 
profoundly affected peoples’ perceptions about the latest set of crop-improvement techniques. Among the 
continuum of genetic modification methods, Drew and Pardey (2003) distinguish between classically bred 
crops using techniques like hybridization that became commonplace among scientific breeders beginning a 
century ago, and varieties whose DNA has been manipulated with bioengineering techniques like the 
ballistic gun or agrobacterium mediated transformations of DNA that form the forefront of present crop 
improvement methods. Confounding efforts to neatly classify crop varieties, some modern varieties are 
conventionally bred but incorporate herbicide tolerant genes identified using modern genomic methods.   3 
making the future of crop-improvement inextricably tied to the future of the 
biotechnologies increasingly used to manipulate them. 
Whether these changing market, scientific, and intellectual property regimes will 
help or hinder efforts to develop and disseminate varietal technologies in the future, and 
especially the crop innovations required by the developing world, is an open question. In 
this paper we survey and report newly compiled evidence on the research and, especially, 
the intellectual property landscapes regarding plant biotechnologies as a step toward 
resolving these questions. 
 
2.  Crop Biotechnology Creation  
Crop biotechnologies are not necessarily used or protected where created. Here we 
investigate the location and structure of the relevant R&D sectors as a basis for analyzing 
the patterns of intellectual property rights in the resulting crop innovations and their uptake 
worldwide. 
Research Spending. In 1995 about half a trillion (nearly $500 billion, 1993 prices) U.S. 
dollars was invested in all public and privately financed science worldwidearound 85 
percent of it conducted in rich countries (Pardey and Beintema 2001). Agricultural research 
accounted for $33 billion of this total or nearly 7 percent of all private and public spending 
on science. 
The public share of agricultural investment was substantial, but is now flagging. 
Worldwide, public investments in agricultural research nearly doubled in inflation-adjusted 
terms over the past two decades, from an estimated $11.8 billion in 1976 to nearly $22 
billion in 1995. Yet for many parts of the world, growth in spending during the 1990s   4 
slowed dramatically. In the rich countries, public investment grew just 0.3 percent annually 
between 1991 and 1996 compared with 2.3 percent per year during the 1980s. In Africa, 
there was no growth at all. In Asia, the 4.4 percent annual growth figure compared with 7.5 
percent the previous decade. 
The distribution of spending on agricultural research has shifted as well. In the 
1990s, for the first time, developing countries as a group spent more on public agricultural 
research than the developed countries. Among the rich countries, $10.2 billion in public 
spending was concentrated in just a handful of countries. In 1995 the United States, Japan, 
France and Germany accounted for two thirds of this public research, about the same as 
two decades before. Just three developing countriesChina, India, and Brazilspent 44 
percent of the developing world’s public agricultural research money in 1995, up from 35 
percent in the mid-1970s.  
By the mid-1990s about one third of the $33 billion total public and private 
agricultural research investment worldwide was private (Table 1). But little of this research 
takes place in the developing world. The overwhelming majority ($10.8 billion, or 94 
percent of the global total in 1995) is conducted in developed counties, where private 
research is over half of all expenditures. In developing countries, the private share of 
research is just 5 percent, and public funds are still the major source of support. 
[Table 1: Private and Public Agricultural R&D Investments, circa 1995] 
Private agricultural research is displacing public research generally, and specifically 
in areas like commercial crop breeding for the seeds of crops with high commercial value. 
This tendency is especially pronounced in countries like the United States where private 
agricultural R&D was 90 percent of public spending in 1960, growing to 133 percent by   5 
1996, the latest year for which comparable public-private data are available. Private 
investments, fueled by agricultural biotechnology research, gravitate to techniques which 
promise large markets, are protected by intellectual property rights, and are easily 
transferable across agroecologies. These included food processing and other post-harvest 
technologies and chemical inputs including pesticides, herbicides and fertilizers. Hence, 
while private research is much more geographically concentrated than public research, 
many of its fruits may be more easily transferred across borders and agroecological zones. 
Even so, private research is far less likely in products or methods with small markets, weak 
intellectual property protection, and limited transferability, precisely the situations in which 
most poor farmers are found. 
Research Intensities and Stocks of Knowledge. One way to gauge the commitment of 
agricultural research funds, public or private, is to compare them to national agricultural 
output, rather than measuring them in absolute terms. This relative measure captures the 
intensity of investment in agricultural research as a percentage of agricultural GDP, not just 
the amount of total research spending. In 1995, as a group, developed countries spent $5.43 
on public and private agricultural R&D for every one hundred dollars of agricultural output 
compared with just 66 cents per hundred dollars of output for developing countries. The 
eightfold difference in total research intensities illustrates the size of the technological gap 
in agriculture between rich and poor countries. Moreover, the situation is growing worse. 
The difference in public research intensity ratios was 3.5−fold in the 1970s, compared with 
4.3−fold now (an even wider gap would have opened up if private spending was also 
factored in).   6 
These trends may actually understate the scientific knowledge gap. Science is a 
cumulative endeavor, with a snowball effect. Innovations beget new ideas and further 
rounds of innovation or additions to the cumulative stock of knowledge. The sequential and 
cumulative nature of scientific progress and knowledge is starkly illustrated by crop-
improvement. It generally takes 7−10 years of breeding to develop a uniform, stable, and 
superior variety (with improved yield, grain quality, or other attributes). But breeders of 
today build on a base of knowledge built up by breeders of yesteryear. The cumulative 
nature of this process means that past discoveries and related research are an integral part 
of contemporary agricultural innovations. Conversely, the loss of a variety (or the details of 
the breeding histories that brought it about) means the loss of accumulated past research to 
the present stock of knowledge. Providing adequate funding for research is thus only part 
of the science story. Putting in place the policies and practices to accumulate innovations 
and increase and preserve the stock of knowledge is an equally important and almost 
universally unappreciated foundation.
3  
Estimates of the stocks of scientific knowledge arising from public and private 
research conducted in the United States and Sub-Saharan Africa have been developed by 
Pardey and Beintema (2001). Historical research spending (running from 1850 for the 
United States and 1900 for Africa and allowing for a gradual diminution of the effect of 
distant past R&D spending on money measures of the current stock of knowledge) was 
                                                 
3 Discoveries and data that are improperly documented or inaccessible (and so effectively exist only in the 
minds of the relevant researchers) are lost from the historical record when researchers retire from science. 
These “hidden” losses seem particularly prevalent in cash-strapped research agencies in the developing 
world, where inadequate and often irregular amounts of funding limit the functioning of libraries, data banks 
and genebanks, and hasten staff turnover. There can also be catastrophic losses, tied to the political 
instability that is a root cause of hunger. Civil strife and wars cause an exodus of scientific staff, or at least a 
flight from practicing science.    7 
compared with the gross domestic agricultural product for 1995. The accumulated stock of 
knowledge in the United States was ten times more than the amount of agricultural output 
produced in that year. In other words, for every $100 of agricultural output there existed a 
$1,000 stock of knowledge to draw upon. In Africa the stock of knowledge in 1995 was 
actually less than the value of African agricultural output. The ratio of the U.S. knowledge 
stock relative to U.S. agricultural output in 1995 was nearly 12 times higher than the 
corresponding amount for Africa. Stocks of knowledge measures provide a better basis for 
evaluating the developed versus developing country capacities for actually carrying out 
crop biotechnologies, and in fact the overall differences may understate the effective gaps 
for this advanced area of agricultural R&D. These gaps also underscore the immensity, if 
not the outright impossibility, of playing “catch-up,” in addition to the need to transfer 
knowledge across borders and continents. 
Biotechnology Trials. Absent meaningful data on “crop-related biotechnology research” 
spending, the only indication of the location of crop biotechnology research is data on the 
number of field trials conducted internationally.
4 Pardey and Beintema (2001) compiled data 
on the number of field trials conducted on bioengineered crops from 1987 through December 
2000 grouped by the regions in the world where the trials were conducted (Table 2).
5 
                                                 
4 Precisely what is meant by “crop-related biotechnology research” is difficult to determine. “Biotechnology” 
can run the whole gambit from conventional breeding, through culturing methods, to genomic and 
bioengineering (including transgenic) techniques. In addition, and as discussed regarding the patent data 
reported below, many biotechnology techniques developed with spending directed to the health sciences, for 
example, have agricultural applications as well. 
5 As indicators of the level of bioengineering research effort, these data must be taken with a grain of salt. To 
meaningfully assess the distribution of transgenic crops being tested in the ground, one would like the notion 
of “field trial” to be standardized across countries. One option is to count each location as a separate 
instance. But in the United States, for example, a “location” can have many sites. For example, test 01-024-
26n in the APHIS database contains Pennsylvania as one location, but there are 313 sites comprising a total 
of 1,838 acres. Likewise, Canada lists field trials conducted at multiple sites within a province as one field 
trial, but it is not clear if all the data for all the other countries are reported similarly.   8 
According to these data, a total of twenty seven countries conducted trials on 14 different 
crops and 183 different “events.”
6  
[Table 2: Field Trials of Bioengineered Crops by Regions of the World] 
Eighty four percent of the world’s trials were conducted in rich countries; two thirds 
of the total was in the United States and Canada alone. This points to a biotechnology-
research gap between rich and poor countries that is even more pronounced than the gap in 
overall agricultural R&D spending (wherein 64 percent of global agricultural R&D was 
conducted in rich counties). Two fundamental factors may account for much of the marked 
spatial asymmetry in agricultural biotechnology research: specifically, who conducts the 
research, and the nature of the science itself. First, as indicted in Table 2, the preponderance 
of these biotechnology trials are conducted by private firms and most of the world’s private 
agricultural R&D (about 94 percent, Table 1) takes place in rich counties. Second, this type 
of cutting-edge research requires access to highly skilled scientists, well functioning 
scientific infrastructure that provides ready access to reagents and a myriad of laboratory 
equipment and supplies, along with technical information, and the appropriately trained 
support staff to help carry out the research. Even though most of the trials are conducted by 
private firms, the sophistication of the research involved and its pace of change mean that 
“applied” aspects of the biosciences are likely to receive significant spillovers from on-going 
basic research, and from accumulated stocks of scientific knowledge arising from past 
research, both elements that are much more readily supplied in rich than poor countries. 
Indeed, it is the localized spillovers from university research (often involving tacit 
                                                 
6 An event involves the insertion of a specific gene in a particular crop, resulting in the expression of a trait in 
that crop. For example, insertion of the Bt cry1(c) protein producing gene into a particular cotton variety is 
considered an event.   9 
knowledge embodied in the scientific and technically trained people that form part of 
university communities) that influences the location of industrialized R&D (Adams 2001).
7 
 
3.  An Economic Primer on Intellectual Property Rights 
Research and development (R&D), like almost all other aspects of life, is an economic 
activity. Who pays for the research, who performs what research where, and who gains and 
looses (and by how much) as a consequence are all influenced by economic incentives. The 
degree to which innovators can appropriate the fruits of their endeavors lies at the heart of 
the incentives to invest, giving rise to pervasive policies worldwide to assign property 
rights to innovations in an effort to better align private incentives with social interests.  
The conventional rationale for protecting intellectual property by patents or other 
means is to provide some proprietary or “monopoly” rights to an invention—albeit 
circumscribed and exclusionary in nature—in exchange for public disclosure of the details 
of the invention (Nordhaus 1969). What is disclosed may be useful for further innovation. 
But the monopoly right also encourages invention directly, and the social value of the right 
tends to include surplus above the private value. Thus, the (private and social) benefits of 
patents include wide diffusion of the creation of aspects of new or advanced technologies. 
The costs are transitory (for the life of a patent) and entail higher-than-otherwise prices or 
constrained choices of innovations subject to some monopolistic behavior. However, this 
conventional, static, one-off view of invention does not fully reflect the dynamic nature of 
a large part of research and development.  
                                                 
7 See also Graff, Rausser, and Small (2003).   10 
Much technological change comes in the form of cumulative innovation processes, 
whereby the fruits of innovation frequently materialize as the embodiment of a sequence of 
prior innovations. While strong patent protection may stimulate the earlier-than-otherwise 
development of a research tool, it can also delay or deter follow-on innovation due to the 
transaction costs of negotiating a license or merger and the ability to prevent competitors 
from introducing similar technology (Merges and Nelson 1990, Heller and Eisenberg 
1998). Thus the dynamic cost of a patent within a cumulative innovation scheme—which 
includes the accumulated costs of delayed follow-on inventions—is an important policy 
consideration that is often neglected when counting the conventional (i.e., static) social cost 
of a patent (Koo and Wright 2002).  
A special case of cumulative innovation involves the development of a research 
tool, that is a product or process whose only value is as an input to follow-on innovations. 
In agricultural biotechnology, a research tool can be a patent on a DNA sequence modified 
to enhance the expression of a trait such as insect-resistance, while the follow-on 
innovation may be a new transgenic variety of cotton. Since the patentee of a research tool 
can capture revenue only through direct production of the follow-on innovations, efficient 
compensation of the patentee, through licensing, joint ventures, or other means, is critical 
in providing the incentive to innovate research tools. In addition, these efficient 
mechanisms also reduce the transaction costs incurred by those contracting for use of the 
rights, thereby encouraging the utilization of research tools by follow-on innovators. 
One way of reducing dynamic costs and encouraging technology transactions is to 
clarify property rights. The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and subsequent legislation, which 
allowed U.S. universities, other non-profit institutions, and government labs to patent and   11 
exclusively license federally funded inventions, was intended to achieve this purpose. 
Firms are often unwilling to invest significantly in developing and disseminating 
innovations lacking clearly defined property rights. This point was clearly captured by the 
1945 Report of the U.S. House of Representatives, which stated that “…what is available 
for exploitation by everyone is undertaken by no one (cited from Jaffe 2000, p.534).” The 
main objective of the Bayh-Dole Act is to foster markets for the transfer of technology, and 
there is some evidence the Act has achieved these aims (Jensen and Thursby 2001). 
However, the Bayh-Dole Act is most effective when inventions require heavy expenditure 
in downstream technology and product development, which is not the case for all 
technologies. In addition, some have argued that the Act may actually constrain and delay 
the flow of fundamental scientific knowledge (as “prior art” concerns impede open 
scientific discourse through seminars and the professional literature) and shift the emphasis 
of university research from fundamental basic research toward more applied research that 
is potentially more rewarding financially for the university (or its research faculty) but not 
necessarily for society as a whole over the longer run (Mazzoleni and Nelson 1998). 
The impact of a patent system also depends on the type of technology itself. 
Agriculture seeds have special attributes, most significantly their almost costlessly 
reproducible nature, which merit special attention. Under plant variety protection schemes, 
farmers may legally save and reuse (and sometimes sell) seeds in following seasons, so that 
seed firms are faced with only the residual demand for their seeds in subsequent seasons. 
This problem, together with the difficulty of monitoring and enforcing property rights to 
seed, makes its legal protection less valuable than other forms of protection on other 
products. Private seed markets have responded to the appropriability problem by   12 
developing hybrid varieties or pursuing genetic use restriction technologies (GURTS), both 
of which prevent seeds from effectively reproducing, a form of “biological” rather than 
legal property protection. 
What evidence is there that intellectual property rights (IPRs) stimulate inventive 
activity? Although there are no readily measurable markets for IPRs in which the benefits 
and costs of patents, for example, can be easily evaluated, a few studies have sought to 
measure the overall inventive effects of patents. Findings from survey studies suggest that 
innovators rely primarily on other means (like trade secrets or first-mover advantages) 
rather than patent protection to appropriate the returns from their innovative investment, 
with the exception of pharmaceuticals (Levin et al. 1987, Cohen et al. 2000). Some have 
estimated the private value of patent protection using patent data, concluding that the 
distribution of patent-rights values is sharply skewed, with most of the value concentrated 
in a small number of patents (Lanjouw et al. 1998). Using European patent renewal data, 
Schankerman (1998) estimated that the private value of patent protection was about 15-25 
percent of the related R&D expenditure, suggesting a small impact of patent rights on 
innovative behavior.  
Most empirical studies, all using U.S. data, have generally found weak or 
indeterminate empirical evidence to suggest that plant breeders’ rights are effective in 
stimulating investments in varietal-improvement research (Perrin et al. 1983, Knudson and 
Pray 1991, Alston and Venner 2002). Some point out that plant variety protection does not 
provide patent-like ex ante investment incentives, nor generate substantial ex post licensing 
and enforcement activity (Janis and Kesan 2002). Alston and Venner (2002) found that   13 
varietal rights for wheat in the United States had little measurable impact on the rate of 
technical change in that crop, and may simply have served as a marketing tool.  
Given evidence of the general lack of appropriability from patent or plant variety 
protection, why do innovators continue to apply for IP protection? Even accepting the 
claims that practicing patents may not be the primary means by which large firms recoup 
their R&D investments, it can still be an important incentive mechanism for smaller new 
entrants and the venture capital firms that often fund them. Patent portfolios may be critical 
to obtaining venture capital or to maintaining control of the technology while downstream 
innovation is pursued or production and sales capabilities are established (Kitch 1977, 
Mazzoleni and Nelson 1998). In addition, firms (large and small alike) use patents to block 
products of their competitors, and as bargaining chips when negotiating cross-licensing 
agreements, as is the case of the semiconductor industry (Hall and Ziedonis 2001). 
Strategic patenting behavior that relies on larger patent portfolios is consistent with rising 
rates of patenting and high patent-to-R&D spending ratios, even absent any perceived 
increase in the appropriable value of patents. For some developing countries with newly 
introduced plant variety rights such as China, a surge in PVP applications may be explained 
by an over-optimistic view of the prospective value of varietal rights even though the 
current size of the seed market and the cost and effectiveness of protection do not seem to 
economically justify the extent of protection presently being sought (Koo et al. 2003). 
 
4.  Crop Biotechnologies as Property 
Creating new crop biotechnologies is one thing, protecting the intellectual property 
embodied in them is an altogether (but not unrelated) other thing, with its own set of   14 
economic costs and benefits. Notwithstanding the incentive-to-innovate arguments 
broached in the previous section, one view is that intellectual property rights over plant 
biotechnologies in rich and poor countries leads to a lock-out phenomenon: the growth in 
intellectual property is restricting access to proprietary research results in ways that curtail 
the freedom to operate for research conducted in or on behalf of poor countries, to the 
detriment of developing-country food-security prospects. This view is commonly held, 
absent evidence on the international pattern of intellectual property protection, or a clear 
understanding of the effect this has on the rate and direction of inventive activity, the use to 
which these inventions are put, and the trade in agricultural products arising from this 
research. What follows is a first pass at describing the IPR evidence for plant 
biotechnologies internationally. 
Plant Variety Protection 
Global trends. Table 3 shows the pattern of applications for plant breeders rights (PBRs) 
since 1971 for 36 countries grouped into four per-capita-income classes. More than 
136,000 PBR applications have been lodged worldwide since 1971.
8 During the 1970s and 
1980s, rich countries accounted for 92 to 96 percent of the total applications. Their share 
throughout the 1990s declined to average 77 percent in 2001-02. PBR applications filed in 
upper-middle-income countries—including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, South Africa, and Uruguay—grew steadily since the early 
1970s, while reported PBR applications in lower-middle-income countries—that now 
                                                 
8 Some applications were lodged before 1970, but the number is small compared with the totals reported in 
Table 3.   15 
includes Bulgaria, Colombia, Romania, and the Russian Republic—began increasing a 
decade later. 
[Table 3: Plant Breeders Rights Applications—Countries Grouped by Per Capita Income, 
1971-2002] 
The shifting geographical pattern of plant varietal protection arises for several 
reasons. The growth in the total number of applications for high-income countries is largely 
due to an increase in the rate of applications per country per year. Most high-income 
countries had PBR legislation in place for most of the period reported here. In contrast—
and setting aside some initial “start-up” blips in PBR applications—, the majority of 
middle-income countries showed no general tendency to increase their rates of application 
over time.
9 In fact some countries in this group experienced a decline in application rates. 
For this group, the preponderance of growth was due mainly to an increase in the number 
of countries offering plant breeders rights (3 countries in 1971, 5 in 1985, 8 in 1990 and 13 
in 2002).
10 An exception was the lower-middle-income countries where there was a 
particularly marked jump from 131 applications during 1991-1995 to 2,437 applications 
                                                 
9 Koo et al. (2003) describe a start-up phenomenon in China when it began issuing PBRs in April 1999, 
where an initial blip in applications was taken to reflect pent up demand for these anticipated rights being 
satisfied. Note, China is not included in the UPOV series reported here. 
10 Plant breeders’ rights have been available in many rich countries for at least the past three decades. 
Germany, for example, has issued plant breeders rights since at least the 1950s and likewise for a few other 
European countries. The United States began issuing plant variety protection certificates (PVPCs) in 1971 
for sexually reproduced plants: asexually reproduced plants (like grape vines, fruit trees, strawberries, and 
ornamentals that are propagated through cuttings and graftings) have had recourse to intellectual property 
protection since 1930 when the Plant Patent Act was passed. Many middle-income counties passed PVP 
legislation during the 1990s in compliance with their sui generis obligations to offer the intellectual property 
rights over plant varieties enshrined in article 27(3)b of the 1995 Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property (TRIPS) agreement in the World Trade Organization (WTO). An indication of the geographical 
extent of plant breeders’ rights is the listing of member countries of the International Union for the 
Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV). At its inception in 1961, UPOV had 5 member countries 
(Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and Netherlands, all of them high-income countries), growing to 20 
countries by the end of 1992, then increasingly rapidly to 53 countries—21 high income, 27 middle income 
and 5 low income—as of September 2003. Notably, under the TRIPs agreement, the “least developed” 
countries (a WTO designation) are exempt from complying with article 27(3)b until 2005.    16 
during 1996-2000. Applications lodged in the Russian Federation (which reports 
applications beginning in 1994) grew rapidly to 825 in 2001, and there were much smaller 
but still sizable increases in Colombia and Bulgaria as well during the late 1990s. 
Increasing rates of protection may reflect legal-cum-economic as well as institutional 
factors. One would expect applications to increase over time as awareness of the existence 
and effectiveness of PBRs in a particular country increased and as the economic costs of 
applying for and evaluating applications declined with improved bureaucratic procedures.
11 
  Notably, the number of plant breeders rights sought in low-income countries is 
negligible. Since 1971 they accounted for just 145 (0.106 percent) of the global total of 
136,234 recorded PBR applications, with almost 85 percent of these rights being sought in 
the Ukraine alone. The principal proximate cause of this situation is the lack of rights on 
offer in poor-countries. More fundamentally, it reflects a range of economic influences 
regarding the costs and benefits of securing breeders rights in a particular jurisdiction. 
To capture this cost-benefit calculus, Koo et al. (2003) use an option value model to 
characterize the crop breeders’ decision to apply for and retain varietal protection. While 
the costs of gaining and securing plant variety protection are known with reasonable surety, 
the sequence of future returns from a varietal right is highly uncertain for many reasons. 
There are uncertainties about the size of the appropriable seed market for a given crop, the 
probability of commercial success of the protected variety, and the extent of enforcement 
of assigned property rights. Where required, breeders make periodic (often annual) renewal 
                                                 
11 In addition, some countries have expanded the scope of crops eligible for protection overtime. In China, for 
instance, a total of 10 species were eligible for protection in September 1999, growing to 30 species by 
March 2002 (including 5 major cereals, 2 oil crops, 2 roots and tubers, 10 vegetables and fruits and 11 
flowers and grasses but excluding cotton).    17 
decisions, preserving the right to pay renewal fees and exercise their exclusionary rights in 
future periods. Thus applying for, and subsequently renewing, PVP rights is a way of 
reserving the rights to potential future revenues, even if revenues in the short term are 
negligible. Thus the expected value of holding plant variety rights consists of the current 
returns captured from the coming year and the option to renew the right in the subsequent 
year.  
Decisions taken by individual breeders to obtain PBRs in a particular jurisdiction, 
and the factors that affect those decisions, are directly relevant for efforts to account for 
variations across countries in the total number of PBRs sought. Specifically, other things 
being equal, countries with weaker effective property rights (be they related to plant 
biotechnologies or crop varieties in particular, or more broadly, including the rights 
encompassed by commercial contract law) and those with smaller sized seed markets are 
likely to have less PBR applications than countries with larger seed markets and more 
effective property rights. 
To test this notion, we regressed the total number of PBR applications for 42 
countries (i = 1,…., 42) during the period 1997-2001, PBRTi, against the total value of crop 
production in 2002, VCi, the per capita income of each country in 2002, PCIi, and the 
period of time in years since varietal rights applications were first lodged, PTi. The value of 
crop production was deemed indicative of the value of the corresponding seed markets,
12 
per capita income was used as an instrumental variable measuring the effectiveness of 
PBRs, while the number of years since varietal rights were first on offer proxied the 
                                                 
12 For those counties in which we had overlapping data, regressing the value of crop production against the 
proximate value of seed sales (obtained from ISF 2003) revealed a reasonably strong association—
specifically a correlation coefficient of 0.72.   18 
transactions costs involved in securing and maintaining rights (the longer the PBR 
legislation has been operative, presumably the lower the costs). Our regression results are 
reported in Table 4. Choice of functional form is always problematic, so we tried two 
commonly used forms. Regression (1) is a double-log specification, wherein both the 
dependent and all the independent variables were logged, and regression (2) is a semi-log 
specification wherein only the right-hand side variables are logged. 
[Table 4: Plant Variety Rights Applications—Regression Results] 
Obvious omitted variable and other empirical issues caution against over-
interpreting these results. But they are nonetheless suggestive, not least because well over 
40 percent of the cross-country variation in total PBR applications (as indicated by the 
error sums of squares, R
2) is accounted for by the included variables. Greater numbers of 
varietal rights applications are associated with more valuable seed markets and more 
effective IPR protection (as indexed by the per capita income variable, PCI). Even after 
controlling for differences in market size and IPR effectiveness, lowering the transactions 
costs involved in applying for protection (as proxied by PT) also generates statistically 
significant increases in PBR applications.  
Foreign PBR Applications. The UPOV data on varietal rights applications allows us to 
distinguish between domestic and foreign applicants. Overall, 33 percent (16,548 of a total 
of 48,675) of the applications filed during 1997–2001 were lodged by foreigners, an 
indication of the extent of potential spillovers of varietal improvement research done in one 
locale on seed market and production developments elsewhere in the world. Just on two 
thirds of the total foreign applications were filed in rich countries and only one percent in   19 
low-income countries. Middle-income countries make up the balance, with 26 percent of 
the foreign applications being lodged in upper-middle income countries.  
The  intensity of foreign participation in domestic varietal rights markets differs 
markedly. Looking regionally, 61 percent of the PBR applications in upper middle-income 
countries were lodged by foreigners, 32 percent of the low-income applications are foreign, 
as are 31 percent of the applications in high-income countries and 22 percent of those 
lodged in lower-middle income countries. The country-by-country participation of 
foreigners is even more variable. For example, 84 percent of the applications in 
Switzerland are foreign as are 82 percent of the Canadian applications. For the United 
States the share is 54 percent, and lower in other European countries (e.g., 37 percent in the 
United Kingdom, 16 percent in the Netherlands and Germany, and 11 percent in France). 
Foreigners account for 23 percent of the PBR applications lodged in Japan.  
Regressions (3) and (4) in Table 4 were run to assess if there was any systematic 
sources of variation in the foreign intensity of national PBR applications using the same 
variables we used to account for cross-country variation in total PBR applications. Between 
22 and 25 percent of the variation in foreign intensity ratios was explained by our variables. 
All the explanatory variables had the expected signs, with the size of the domestic seed 
market being the statistically most significant explanator of the degree to which foreigners 
participate in local PBR markets.  
European and United States Trends. Worldwide, seed sales are estimated to be $30 
billion annually (ISF 2003). While the economic value of seed markets within the 
European Union (about $5.2 billion in total) are a little less than U.S. seed sales ($5.7 
billion), there have been three times more PBR applications lodged throughout Europe than   20 
the United States since 1971 (Table 5). This may partly reflect the different forms of 
varietal protection effectively on offer in Europe versus the United States. Plant varieties 
have been subject to utility patents in the United States since 1985, whereas utility patents 
for plant varieties in Europe is still not an established practice (Henson-Apollonio 2002). 
Overall, there are more than twice as many plants for which protection is sought under the 
1930 U.S. Plant Patent Act as PVP applications, trending toward a higher proportion of 
plant patent versus PVP applications over time. Another explanation is the historical 
practice of multiple applications for the same variety among different national jurisdictions 
in Europe, whereas only one application is required per variety in the United States. 
[Table 5: Plant Breeders Rights Applications in the European Union and the United States] 
  Four countries—the Netherlands, France, Germany and the United Kingdom—
account for most of the European applications. Adding applications lodged with the 
Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO) to those filed nationally, the Netherlands 
accounted for 35 percent of the European total, France 22 percent, Germany 16 percent and 
the United Kingdom 8 percent.
13 The number of PBR applications filed with the CPVO has 
increased over time, offsetting declines in the number of applications lodged with national 
protection offices. In 1996, there were 1,385 applications lodged with the CPVO and a total 
of 2,766 applications made to individual national systems. By 2000, almost equal numbers 
                                                 
13 Prior to April 27, 1995 when the Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO) was established, a breeder 
seeking protection for a variety throughout the European Union was required to submit an application to 
each of the member states. Now with a single application to the Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO), a 
breeder can be granted varietal protection rights throughout the European Union. This European-wide 
system—CPVO members currently include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom—operates in 
parallel with respective national systems, although the owner of a variety cannot simultaneously exploit both 
a community plant variety right (CPVR) and a national plant breeders right in relation to that variety. 
Individuals or companies from member states of UPOV, but not a member of the European Union, can also 
apply, provided that an agent domiciled in the Community has been nominated. The duration of CPVR 
protection is 25 years for most crops, and 30 years for potato, vine and tree varieties.   21 
of PBR claims were filed with the CPVO and the respective national offices (about 2,000 
applications each), and in 2001 CPVO applications (2,158) exceeded those filed with 
national offices (1,864)(UPOV 2002). 
About 85 percent of the PVP applications made in the United States since 1971 
were filed by private companies (Table 6). Universities accounted for 11 percent of the 
total overall, with comparatively few applications from private foundations or government 
agencies such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Just four private firms—Dupont 
(including Pioneer HiBred), Seminis, Monsanto, and DeltaPine—accounted for 31 percent 
of the total PBR applications since 1971. The only two public entities to appear among the 
top 15 applicants are the Texas and Minnesota agricultural experiment stations (ranked 8
th 
and 9
th respectively), with up to 150 applicants accounting for the remaining 57 percent of 
the total. Notably the pattern of PVP applications has become less, not more, concentrated 
over time. The top four applicants overall accounted for the same share in 1981-90 as in 
2001-02, while the share of the 16
th and lower ranked applicants grew from 54 to 62 
percent. 
[Table 6: US Plant Variety Protection Certificate Applications by Applicant] 
  Regarding the types of crops for which varietal protection is sought, oil and cereal 
crops—in descending order of importance, soybeans, wheat and corn—accounted for 55 
percent of the U.S. total since 1971, while vegetable crops and grasses made up another 30 
percent (Table 7). Ornamental plants accounted for only 2 percent of the U.S. total. This 
contrast with European patterns of protection, where 60 percent of the PBR applications 
lodged with the CPVO since 1995 were for ornamental plants, 23 percent for agricultural 
crops, and 10 percent for vegetables (Table 8). However, if 88 percent of the U.S. plant   22 
patents were for clonally propagated ornamentals (a feasible share), the types of material 
for which protection is sought in the United States would be in line with European 
practices.  
[Table 7: US Plant Variety Protection Certificate Applications by Crop Category] 
[Table 8: CPVO Plant Breeders Rights Applications by Type of Crop, 1996-2002] 
Biotechnology Patenting Patterns  
An initial foray into examining the international dimensions of patent activity in 
biotechnology and specific sectors, such as agriculture and health, is presented in Figure 1. 
Numbers of patent applications submitted to the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) (Panel a) and patents granted by the 
European Patent Office (EPO) (Panel b) are plotted against the year published. For this 
analysis, patent documents were selected on the basis of the International Patent 
Classification (IPC) scheme used by the patent offices. Data were obtained for documents 
satisfying criteria for “biotechnology” and further sub-divided into “agricultural 
biotechnology” and “health biotechnology.”
14 The numbers of the two sub-divisions add to 
more than for biotechnology as some documents fit into both categories. While initially 
agricultural biotechnology patent documents exceeded health related documents both at 
EPO and WIPO, the situation reversed in 1999. Furthermore, the spectacular rise in patent 
filings in the late 1980s and through the 1990s appears to be leveling off.  
[Figure 1: Biotechnology Patents] 
                                                 
14 For this work, “biotechnology” refers to "the application of science and technology to living organisms as 
well as parts, products and models thereof, to alter living or non-living materials for the production of 
knowledge, goods and services", a definition used by the OECD (see “Statistical definition of 
biotechnology” 12 June 2002 in the Biotechnology, Statistics section of www.oecd.org)    23 
The data presented here contrast with recently reported analyses of Graff et al. 
(2003) who noted drops in patent grants in plant biotechnology at the EPO after peaking in 
1994-1995. The differences may be due to disparities in the definition of plant or 
agricultural biotechnology. Their definition comprises a description of the scope of 
technologies, such as genetic engineering of plants, plant genes, and plant breeding 
methods. They appear to choose only those documents having one of a small subset of IPC 
codes and specific technology keywords. In contrast, our definition encompasses many 
aspects of plant biotechnology, including genetic modification of plants, biocides, 
organismal or enzymic-based methods for preservation of foods, microbiological treatment 
of water and soil, compositions containing micro-organisms or enzymes, and processes 
using micro-organisms or enzymes. The definitional differences are highlighted by the 
order of magnitude difference in the number of documents that satisfy the criteria. For 
example, in 2000, we obtained 8,859 PCT patent filings and 5,097 EP patent grants for 
inventions concerning agricultural biotechnology compared with around 625 PCT 
applications and 50 EP patent grants for the narrower area of “plant biotechnology” 
reported by Graff et al. (2003).  
The percentage of PCT applications in agricultural biotechnology has been on the 
rise. In 1985, agricultural biotechnology applications were 4.0 percent of the total 
submitted. By 1990, they were 7.5 percent of the total, and in 2000 had risen to 9.7 percent 
of the total. In 2000, ag-biotech patents granted in EPO were 18.5 percent of the total 
granted. Clearly further examination of patent activity with an eye to the commercial and 
public good consequences encompassing the changing geographical and institutional   24 
origins of biotechnology innovations on a global scale, and their spillovers or transfer to 
other countries, will be sensitive to the patents included in the source set of documents.   
 
5.  Crop Biotechnology Use 
The evidence on the worldwide dissemination of contemporary, bioengineered crop 
technologies is usefully viewed in the context of the diffusion of the classically bred crop 
varieties that preceded them. 
Classically Bred Crop Varieties 
Worldwide, around 95 percent of major cereal production gains during the past four 
decades came from increased yields, which have more than doubled since 1961 (Runge et 
al. 2003). Increasing yields result from increased use of inputs such as agricultural 
chemicals (including fertilizers, herbicides, and pesticides), irrigation water, and improved 
crop varieties. In the developed world at least, the growth in crop yields began picking up 
pace several hundred years ago. Looking in detail at developments in U.S. wheat varieties 
since 1800, Olmstead and Rhode (2002), for example, estimated that roughly one-half of 
the U.S. growth in labor productivity in that crop between 1839 and 1909 was attributable 
to biological innovations. Pardey et al. (1996) showed that wheat varietal change in the 
United States accelerated during the 20
th century—an average of 5.1 commercially 
successful wheat varieties were introduced each year from 1901 to 1970, the rate jumped to 
21.6 varieties per year during the period 1971 to 1990. Moreover, the creation of these new 
varieties continued to rely heavily on foreign germplasm. By the early 1990s, one-fifth of   25 
the total U.S. wheat acreage and virtually all the spring-wheat cropped in California were 
sown to varieties with CIMMYT ancestry.
15  
  There are still long lags between committing R&D dollars and realizing the returns 
on that investment. Even in the United States it took decades to build up the genetic 
resource base and train and deploy the scientists skilled in classical genetic manipulation 
techniques before reaping the really big dividends during the latter half of the 20
th century. 
In the developing world, scientific crop breeding lagged well behind. Beginning in the 
1950s and 1960s, improved varieties became increasingly available to farmers and yields 
rose: wheat went from 1 ton per hectare or less in China and India in the mid-1960s to over 
2.5 tons in India, and almost 4 tons in China, by the late 1990s. Table 9 shows the rapid 
spread of modern rice, wheat and maize varieties throughout the developing world. Asia 
embraced these new varieties most rapidly, while adoption lagged in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
A striking feature of these data, however, is the limited uptake of scientifically bred crop 
varieties throughout most of the developing world as late as 1970. When virtually all the 
cropped acreage in rich countries was sown to scientifically bred rice and wheat varieties, 
less than one-third of the developing world’s rice acreage and just one-fifth of its wheat 
acreage were planted to modern forms of these crops.  
[Table 9: Share of Area Planted to Modern Varieties of Rice, Wheat, and Maize] 
For these three food staples much of the crop improvement research involved 
publicly funded and conducted research. The big innovation of the 1960s and 1970s for rice 
                                                 
15 CIMMYT is the Spanish acronym for the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center based in El 
Batãn, Mexico. Pardey et al. (1996) estimated that the improved genetic makeup of wheat varieties between 
1970 and 1993 was worth almost $43 billion (1993 prices) to the United States—equivalent to 10.6 percent 
of the present value of wheat production during this period—, and that up to $13.6 billion of that total 
benefit was attributable to varietal spillins from CIMMYT alone.   26 
and wheat was the development and release of increasing numbers of semi-dwarf varieties 
by national and international research agencies bred using plant material and crop 
transformation techniques that were entirely public domain. Almost all the resulting 
improved varieties were made available without personal or corporate intellectual property 
rights. The public sector performed most of the research, and in few jurisdictions were 
IPRs over the varieties themselves or the techniques used to transform them even a legal 
option at that time. 
For corn the story is a different. While publicly bred varieties were, and remain, a 
feature of this crop, the private sector presence is much more pronounced. Hybrid corn 
technologies that took off in the United States in the 1930s (and later elsewhere) offered 
significant protection for the intellectual property embodied in them. This made it possible 
for breeders to appropriate a larger share of varietal benefits than was possible for the self-
replicating forms of varietal transformations featured in rice and wheat.
16 For hybrid corn 
varieties, as long as the in-bred lines were kept secret (and laws were in place in the United 
States and elsewhere to help preserve these trade secrets), the cost of imitation was 
prohibitively large enabling inventors to appropriate significant shares of the benefits 
stemming from their efforts.  
Table 9 indicates the developing-country uptake of modern maize varieties has also 
been substantial, but less extensive than the move to improved forms of rice and wheat 
worldwide. This could partly be due to the greater proprietary (and private sector) nature of 
                                                 
16 Hybrid technologies were also pursued for rice and wheat but less extensively so. Knudson and Ruttan 
(1988) document efforts to develop hybrid wheats in the United States. Hybrid rice is grown extensively in 
China, beginning in the mid-1960s. Since then, the area under hybrid rice has increased steadily to about 23 
percent in 1981 and 61 percent in 2001 (Fan et al. 2003). Notably, profit potentials were not a contributing 
factor to the development of this technology in China where the research was a government undertaking.   27 
maize varietal changes, but a whole host of other influences could be operative as well. 
About 86 percent of the improved acreage world wide is sown to hybrids, the rest to open 
pollinated varieties.  
Varietal Spillovers. While the agroecological specificities of much agricultural R&D—
and especially many crop biotechnologies—limits the geographical scope of agricultural 
innovations, there is overwhelming evidence that spatial spillovers of technologies have 
played a pivotal part in productivity improvements worldwide. In reviewing the economic 
studies of this phenomenon, Alston (2002) concluded that interstate or international R&D 
spillovers might account for half or more of the total measured productivity growth. 
Spillovers of crop varietal technologies have flowed in all sorts of directions. 
Looking at the spillins to the United States of varietal improvement research done at the 
international research centers, specifically CIMMYT in Mexico and IRRI in the 
Philippines, Pardey et al. (1996) estimated that the U.S. economy gained at least US$3.4 
billion and up to US$14.6 billion—depending on the benefit attribution methods 
deployed—from 1970 to 1993 from the use of improved wheat varieties developed by 
CIMMYT. In the same 23-year period, they found that the U.S. economy realized at least 
US$30 million and up to US$1 billion through the use of rice varieties developed by IRRI.   
In more recent research, Pardey et al. (2002) quantified the benefits from crop 
improvement research in Brazil and attributed them between the Brazilian national 
agricultural research agency (Embrapa), other public and private agencies operating in 
Brazil, and spillovers from the CGIAR and the United States. They found that 64 percent of 
the total benefits from varietal improvement for upland rice in Brazil (which had a present 
value of US$1,683 million in 1999 dollars over 1984-2003), were from non-Embrapa   28 
sources. Likewise, 67 percent of the total benefits from varietal improvement research for 
edible beans (which had a present value of US$677 million in 1999 dollars over 1985-
2003) came from non-Embrapa sources, mostly within Brazil, whereas 77 percent of the 
total benefits from varietal improvement research for soybeans (which had a present value 
of US$12,473 million in 1999 dollars over 1981-2003) was due to non-Embrapa sources, 
with 22 percent of the benefits attributable to spillins from the United States. 
Bioengineered Crop Varieties 
Where the crop varieties and bioengineered traits embodied in them perform well and been 
given approval for commercial use, the rate of uptake has been rapid (although contrary to 
some claims, not entirely unprecedented, even for biological innovations used in 
agriculture).
17 James (2002) estimates that 58.7 million hectares were planted to 
bioengineered crops worldwide in 2002, an increase from 52.6 million hectares in the 
previous year and well up on the 2.8 million hectares planted in 1996.
18 
Despite this growth, the geographical, crop, and technological scope of 
bioengineered crops is still small. In 2002, the preponderance of the area under these crops 
consisted of bioengineered soybean (62 percent of the total bioengineered cropping area 
sown to this crop): 21 percent of the area was sown to bioengineered maize, 12 percent to 
cotton, and 5 percent to canola. Just 4 countries accounted for 99 percent of the global total 
in 2002 (Figure 2). Two-thirds of this global total was planted in the United States, 22 
                                                 
17 Griliches (1957) studied the uptake of hybrid corn technologies in the United Sates and showed that Iowa, 
for example, went from 0 to 50 percent of the state’s corn acreage sown to hybrid varieties in just 6 years 
(1932 to 1938), reaching 90 percent by 1940. 
18 The Flavr-Savr
TM tomato, genetically engineered to delay softening so the tomato could ripen on the vine 
and retain its “fresh picked” flavor was the first bioengineered crop to be grown commercially (in 1994). 
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percent in Argentina, 6 percent in Canada, and 3 percent in China. Two traits dominate the 
picture—herbicide tolerance (mainly in soybeans and canola) and insect tolerance (mainly 
in corn and cotton)—with some limited use of bioengineered viral resistance in papaya and 
squash.  
[Figure 2: Area Sown to Bioengineered Crops Worldwide] 
Figure 2 shows that the developing-country share of global bioengineered crop area 
has grown: from 14 percent of the world total in 1997 to about 27 percent in 2002. Notably, 
it is plantings in just four countries—soybeans in Argentina, and cotton in China, South 
Africa, and for the first time in 2002, India—that accounts for the lion’s share of the 
developing-country bioengineered acreage. Finding bioengineered traits that deal 
successfully with local production constraints is one thing, expressing them in specific crop 
varieties that compete well locally against landraces and conventionally bred varieties of 
the same crop (absent the bioengineered trait) is an altogether other thing. Not surprisingly, 
the bioengineered traits are being grown in developing-country areas that are 
agroecologically similar to the rich countries for which the traits were first developed, and 
in most cases involve the identical crop varieties.
19 This is precisely where the spillover 
costs are smallest (consisting mainly of local screening and regulatory approval costs along 
with the costs of marketing the technology). That is, disseminating these particular 
bioengineered crop varieties involves only adaptive or imitative technology development 
costs beyond the initial discovery costs—a much smaller cost than inventing entirely new 
                                                 
19 For example, all the officially approved Monsanto/DeltaPine bioengineered cotton varieties grown in China 
are the same varieties grown in the United States, while most of the bioengineered Chinese varieties are 
based on older DeltaPine varieties introduced into China in the 1940s and 1950s (Pray et al. 2002). Likewise 
the transgenic cotton varieties grown in Mexico are from the United States (Traxler et al. 2003), and in 
South Africa, NuCotn 37-B, an American variety, is widely used (Thirtle et al. 2003).   30 
bioengineered traits and successfully expressing those traits in locally superior varieties of 
locally important crops.  
The site-specificity of many agricultural biotechnologies arises from agroecological 
aspects, which defines the size of the relevant market in a way that is much less common in 
other industrial R&D. As Alston and Pardey (1999) described, one way to think of this is in 
terms of the unit costs of making local research results applicable to other locations (say, 
by adaptive research), which must be added to the local research costs. Such costs grow 
with the size of the market.
20 Economies of size, scale, and scope in research mean that unit 
costs fall with size of the R&D enterprise, but these economies must be traded off against 
the diseconomies of distance and adapting site-specific results (the costs of "transporting" 
the research results to economically "more distant" locations). Thus, as the size of the 
research enterprise increases, unit costs are likely to decline at first (because economies of 
size are relatively important) but will eventually rise (as the costs of economic distance 
become ever-more important). 
Given the United States dominates the world totals, its trends are worth 
scrutinizing. Table 10 shows the trend in bioengineered acreage in the United States since 
1996, differentiating among crops and technology types. Ranked in terms of total acreage, 
the world and U.S. crop relativities for 2002 are the same—soybeans dominate, followed 
by corn then cotton. However, the intensity of use of bioengineered versus classically bred 
crops differs between the Unites States and the rest of the world. 
[Table 10: Bioengineered Cropping Patterns in the United States] 
                                                 
20 A close analogy can be drawn with spatial market models of food processing in which processing costs fall 
with throughput but input and output transportation costs rise with throughput so that when the two elements 
of costs are combined a U-shaped average cost function is derived (e.g., Sexton 1990).   31 
The United States uniformly makes more intensive use of bioengineered crops than 
the rest of the world (Figure 3). While 77 percent of the U.S. canola crop was sown to 
bioengineered varieties in 2002, the corresponding rest-of-world share was 28 percent. 
Likewise, bioengineered soybeans covered 71 percent of the U.S. soybean acreage and only 
28 percent of the rest-of-world soybean area.
21 For cotton the corresponding shares were 71 
percent for the United States and 11 percent for the rest of the world; for corn it was 34 
percent for the United States and 1.4 percent elsewhere. This reflects both technology and 
market realities. While the dominant bioengineered traits (to date targeting mainly 
budworm/boll weevil complexes in cotton, European stem borers in corn, and Roundup® 
and Liberty Link® resistance in soybeans and canola) have yield enhancing or cost 
reducing consequences for rest-of-world farmers, they are especially consequential for U.S. 
producers. And, given their earlier regulatory approval in the United States, these traits are 
now incorporated into a myriad of locally optimized crop varieties. 
[Figure 3: Bioengineered Cropping Intensities—United States vs Rest-of-the-World, 2002] 
 
6.  Summing Up  
In this paper we showed that the preponderance of research conducted on bioengineered 
crops is carried out in rich countries (which is where the overwhelmingly large share of 
biotechnology acreage is still to be found), and much of the product development work is 
done by private firms. Moreover, most of the bioengineered traits and the specific crop 
varieties that are planted in developing countries are spillovers from, or adaptive 
                                                 
21 In some U.S. states, the share of 2002 soybean acres planted to Roundup Ready® soybeans approached 90 
percent (Marra, Pardey and Alston 2003).   32 
modifications of, rich-country research. Only when we achieve a reasonable rate of 
inventor appropriability of the returns to the technologies that are applicable in less-
developed countries, combined with an economic infrastructure that facilitates adoption of 
those technologies, can we expect a significant private-sector role to emerge in the poorer 
parts of the world.  
We also drew attention to the comparatively low rates of investment in public 
agricultural R&D in developing countries, where government revenues may be 
comparatively expensive (because it is comparatively expensive to raise government 
revenues through general taxation measures), or have a comparatively high opportunity 
cost.
22 Many less-developed countries are characterized by under-investment in a host of 
other public goods, such as transportation and communications infrastructure, schools, 
hospitals, and the like, as well as agricultural science. These other activities, like 
agricultural science, might also have high social rates of return.
23 
Even among the rich countries of the world, most have not had very substantial 
private or public agricultural science industries; so why should we expect the poorest 
countries of the world to be more like the richest of the rich in this regard?
 24 The lion’s 
                                                 
22 Alston and Pardey (2003) develop these and related ideas in more detail. 
23 As Alston and Pardey (2003) point out, there are also political factors at play here. In rich countries, 
agriculture is a small share of the economy and any individual citizen bears a negligible burden from 
financing a comparatively high rate of public investment in agricultural R&D (for instance, in the United 
States expenditure of $2 billion on agricultural R&D amounts to less than $10 per person per year). The 
factors that account for high rates of general support for agriculture in the industrialized countries can also 
help account for their comparatively high public agricultural research intensities. In many less-developed 
countries, where agriculture represents a much greater share of the total economic activity, and where per 
capita incomes are much lower, a meaningful investment in public agricultural research might have a much 
more appreciable impact on individual citizens—and the problem is that this burden is felt now, while the 
payoff it promises may take a long time to come, and will be much less visible when it does. 
24 As noted by Pardey and Beintema (2001), the geographical concentration among countries of particular 
classes of research—for instance research into agricultural chemicals or machinery—is even greater than 
that for agricultural R&D in total.   33 
share of the public (as well as private) investment in agricultural science has been 
undertaken by a small number of countries, and these have also been the countries that 
have undertaken the lion’s share of scientific research, more generally.
25 An important 
consideration is economies of size, scale, and scope in research, which influence the 
optimal size and portfolio of a given research institution. In some cases the “optimal” 
institution may efficiently provide research for a state or region within a nation, but for 
some kinds of research the efficient scale of institutions may be too great for an individual 
nation (e.g., see Byerlee and Traxler 2001). Many nations may be too small to achieve an 
efficient scale in much if any of the relevant elements of their interests’ in crop 
biotechnology research, except perhaps in certain types of adaptive research. 
Historically there have been large spillovers of improved varieties (and the 
technology and know-how embodied in them) among countries. However, as Alston and 
Pardey (2003) emphasize, we cannot presume that the rich countries of the world will play 
the same roles as in the past. In particular, countries that in the past relied on technological 
spillovers from the North may no longer have that luxury available to them in the same 
ways or to the same extent. This change can be seen as involving three elements: 
•  The types of technologies being developed in the rich countries may no longer be as 
readily applicable to less-developed countries as they were in the past (the agenda 
in richer countries is shifting away from areas like yield improvement in major 
crops to other crop characteristics and even to non-agricultural issues) 
 
•  The private presence in rich country agricultural R&D has increased and many 
biotech companies are not as interested in developing technologies for many less-
developed country applications, and even where they have such technologies 
                                                 
25 Pardey and Beintema (2001) report that the United States conducted 42 percent of the world’s total 
investment in all science in 1995. 
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available, often they are not interested in pursuing potential markets in less 
developed countries, for a host of reasons 
 
•  Those technologies that are applicable and available are likely to require more 
substantial local development and adaptation, calling for more sophisticated and 
extensive forms of scientific research and development than in the past (for 
instance, more advanced skills in modern biotechnology or conventional breeding 
may be required to take advantage of enabling technologies or simply to make use 
of less-finished lines that require additional work to tailor them to local production 
environments) 
 
In short, different approaches may have to be devised to make it possible for less-
developed countries to achieve equivalent access, to tap into technological potentials 
generated by rich countries; and in many instances less-developed countries may have to 
extend their own R&D efforts farther upstream, to more fundamental areas of the science. 
Some argue that strengthening intellectual property regimes in poorer countries is 
one way of stimulating investments in developing-country R&D as well as efforts to 
commercialize crop technologies developed elsewhere. Others argue that the number and 
breadth of patents, plant breeders’ rights and other forms of intellectual property is already 
hindering the R&D required to tackle food security concerns of poor countries. Binenbaum 
et al. (2003) studied the situation for the 15 staple food crops of the world and concluded 
there was undue concern that intellectual property rights were currently limiting the 
freedom to operate for research on developing-country food staples. This paper reinforced 
the IP evidence they assembled for some key enabling technologies used in agriculture—
IPRs concerning crop biotechnologies are overwhelming concentrated in rich-country 
jurisdictions, meaning poor-country research can proceed largely unencumbered by any 
intellectual property restraints. Binenbaum et al. (2003) also showed that bilateral trade in 
food staples from poor- to rich-country jurisdictions—where the IP was presumptively in 
force—was meager (and limited to just a few crops from a few poor countries), meaning   35 
the results of this research can be disseminated and used with few if any IP impediments if 
the intent is to feed and cloth poor people in poor countries. 
  As things stand today, the constraints to conducting modern crop biotechnology 
research in developing countries appear to lie largely beyond IP concerns. Market 
considerations limit substantial private interests for many crops in many developing 
countries, and the intensity of public investments is generally low for reasons that do not 
seem likely to change soon.
26 Intellectual property rights may have a role to play in 
stimulating efforts to commercialize crops in developing countries, especially helping to 
harness spillin technologies developed elsewhere, but, at least in the nearer term, they will 
be no substitute for rich and poor country governments alike reinvesting in the R&D 
required to maintain and continue adding to the crop yields necessary in the decades ahead. 
                                                 
26 Some even see a scientific apartheid taking shape, with large parts of the developing world being left 
behind or denied the prospects science has to offer for growth, development, and prosperity (Serageldin 
2001). 
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Table 1: Private and Public Agricultural R&D Investments, circa 1995 
 
 Expenditures    Shares 
 Public  Private  Total    Public  Private  Total 
 ( million 1993 international dollars)   (percent) 
Developing countries  11,469  672  12,141    94.5  5.5  100 
Developed countries
  10,215 10,829  21,044   48.5  51.5  100 
              
Total 21,692  11,511  33,204    65.3  34.7  100 
 
Source:  Pardey and Beintema (2001). 
Note:  Drawing together estimates from various sources meant there were unavoidable 
discrepancies in what constitutes “private” and “public” research. For example, the 
available data for Asia includes nonprofit producer organizations as part of private 
research, whereas Pardey and Beintema opted to include research done by nonprofit 
agencies as part of public research in Latin America and elsewhere when possible.  
43 
Table 2: Field Trials of Bioengineered Crops by Regions of the World 
 
         Number of Approved     Field Trials
a 
     Events/crops
a     Number of    Share of 
                   Private 
                 Global  in-country 
         Countries  Events  Crops     Countries Trials      total  total 
                 (percentage) 
Developed Countries  19 160  14    20  9,701    84.2  na 
 United  States   1  49  14    1  6,337    55  83.4 
 Canada   1  49  4    1  1,233    10.7  63.9 
 All  others   17  62 5    18  2,131    18.5 na 
                    
Developing Countries  8 23  4    19  1,822    15.8  na 
 Argentina   1  7 3    1 393    3.4  90.1 
 China   1  5 4    1  45    0.4 na 
 All  others   6  11  3    17  1,384    12 na 
                    
Total     27  183  14     39  11,523     100  na 
 
Source: Pardey and Beintema (2001). 
 
Note: na stands for not available. 
 
a.  Data through to December 2000 where available. For the United States and Canada, and 
perhaps other countries, a single “trial” may consist of tests conducted at multiple (maybe 





Table 3: Plant Breeders Rights Applications—Countries Grouped by Per Capita Income, 1971-2002 
 
Income  group    1971-1975 1976-1980 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2002  Total 
       ( counts)    
Number of Applications          
  High income country (21)
a 1,491  6,607  10,865  20,431  31,362 34,276 12,981 118,013 
  Upper middle income country (9)  66  206  402  1,658  3,555  5,493  2,515  13,895 
  Lower middle income country (4)  25  34  57  57  131  2,437  1,440  4,181 
  Low income country (2)  -  -  -  1  27  117  -  145 
          
Total 1,582  6,847  11,324  22,147 35,075 42,323 16,936 136,234 
          
Application rates      ( counts per year)    
  High income country (21)  298  1,321 2,173 4,086 6,272 6,855 6,491 3,688 
  Upper middle income country (9)  13  41  80  332  711  1,099  1,258  434 
  Lower middle income country (4)  5  7  11  11  26  487  720  131 
  Low income country (2)  -  -  -  0  5  23  -  5 
          
Total  316  1,369 2,265 4,429 7,015 8,465 8,468 4,257 
          
Share of Total      ( percentage)    
  High income country (21)  94  96  96  92  89  81  77  87 
  Upper middle income country (9)  4  3  4  7  10  13  15  10 
  Lower middle income country (4)  2  0  1  0  0  6  9  3 
  Low income country (2)  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
          
Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Source: Authors compiled from data obtained from UPOV (2003). 
 
a.  Bracketed numbers indicate number of countries in each income class based on the classification by the World Bank (2002).  
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Table 4: Plant Variety Rights Applications—Regression Results 
 
   Dependent variable     Dependent variable 
  Total PBR (PBRT)    Foreign PBR (PBRF) 
Variable Name/Definition  log(PBRT)  PBRT     Log(PBRF)  PBRF 
Regression number  (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
          
VC/log value of crop  0.544  475.7    0.294  152.2 
production (US$)  (0.122)**  (119.9)**    (0.175)*  (50.4)** 
          
PCI/log GDP per capita  0.267  755.5    0.470  291.1 
(US$) (0.367)  (350.6)*    (0.513)  (147.4)* 
          
PT/History of PVP  0.044  28.96    0.053  4.908 
implementation (years)  (0.017)**  (16.57)*   (0.024)**  (6.968) 
          
Constant -5.676  -14040.5    -5.179  -4822.1 
 (4.224)  (4153.0)**    (6.075)  (1746.2)** 
          
Number of observations  35  35    35  35 
          
F value  11.27  9.32    4.12  4.8 
          
Adjusted R
2 0.475  0.423      0.215  0.251 
 
Source: Authors calculations. 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. 
* indicates significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level of confidence. 




Table 5: Plant Breeders Rights Applications in the European Union and the United States 
 
Country/region  Before  1970  1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95  1996-2000  2001-02  Total 
         ( counts)        
European Union
a  598  843  4,369  6,374  13,254 20,290 19,232  7,471  72,431 
  Netherlands    140  213  518  1,369 4,252 6,838 4,278 1,386  18,994 
  France  -  -  2,151 2,046 3,206 3,395 2,326  686 13,810 
  Germany  212  244  436  1,007 2,275 3,042 1,306  472  8,994 
  UK  2 6 8 6  500  2,365  1,334  359  4,580 
  Italy    - - - - -  1,349  384  67  1,800 
 Others  244  380  1,256  1,946 3,021 3,301  960  121 11,229 
 CPVO
b  - - - - - -  8,644  4,380  13,024 
             
United States  3,495  1,313  1,587 2,039 3,111 3,594 5,609 1,908  22,656 
  Plant Variety Protection  -  600  614  934  1,228  1,505  1,943  562  7,386 
   Plant Patent  3,495  713  973  1,105 1,883 2,089 3,666 1,346  15,270 
 
Source: Authors compiled from data obtained from the US Patent Statistics Report and Technology Assessment and Forecast Report for the US 
Plant Patent, the US Plant Variety Protection Office Crop Database for the US plant variety protection, UPOV (2003) for data of 
European Union countries, and CPVO (2002) for CPVO data. 
 
a.   Footnote 13 includes a list of the countries included in this total. 
b.   CPVO stands for Community Plant Variety Office. See CPVO (2002) for further details. Around 35 percent of these applications are lodged 
from the Netherlands, 16 percent from Germany, 14 percent from France, 19 percent from elsewhere in the European Union and 16 percent 
from outside the European Union since it was first implemented in 1995. 
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Table 6: US Plant Variety Protection Certificate Applications by Applicant 
 
         Counts of PVP applications           Share of PVP applications    
      1971-80  1981-90 1991-00  2001-02  Total    1971-80  1981-90  1991-00  2001-02  Total 
     ( number of applications)         (percentages)  
Types of institutions                
  Private      1,027       1,900       2,941          436       6,304     85  88  85  78  85 
  University         138          229          358           84          809     11  11  10  15  11 
  Foundation          43           19           96           18          176     4  1  3  3  2 
  Public            6           14           53           24           97     0  1  2  4  1 
                
Total     1,214      2,162      3,448         562      7,386     100  100  100  100  100 
                  
Top 15 applicants                
  Dupont          36          165          508          102          811     3  8  15  18  11 
 Seminis
         110          208          281           36          635     9  10  8  6  9 
  Monsanto         132          252          204           33          621     11  12  6  6  8 
  Delta and Pine Land Company          18           32          129           10          189     1  1  4  2  3 
  Advanta          48           83           48             3          182     4  4  1  1  2 
  Exelixis          38           89           42            -            169     3  4  1  0  2 
  Turf-Seed, Inc            5           53           67             3          128     0  2  2  1  2 
  Texas Agricultural Experiment Station          11           20           36             7           74     1  1  1  1  1 
  Minnesota Agricultural Experiment Station           5           17           29             7           58     0  1  1  1  1 
  W. Atlee Burpee Company          49             6             1            -             56     4  0  0  0  1 
  Del Monte Corporation           -               2           53            -             55     0  0  2  0  1 
  Pickseed West Inc.            5           24           19             4           52     0  1  1  1  1 
  Stoneville Pedigreed Seed Company          13           11           19             8           51     1  1  1  1  1 
  Cebeco             2           18           28             1           49     0  1  1  0  1 
  FFR Cooperative          11           13           25            -             49     1  1  1  0  1 
  Others         731       1,169       1,959          348       4,207     60  54  57  62  57 
                
Total     1,214      2,162      3,448         562      7,386      100  100  100  100  100 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from US Plant Variety Protection Office Crop Database. 
 
Note: Data reported based on all mergers and acquisitions activities as of November 2002. 
 
a.   Includes applications lodged jointly with Monsanto (which total 176 through to end of 2002).   48 
Table 7: US Plant Variety Protection Certificate Applications by Crop Category 
 
 
Crop     Counts           Share    
    1971-80 1981-90 1991-00 2001-02  Total    1971-80  1981-90  1991-00  2001-02  Total 
   ( number of applications)        (percentages)  
Oilcrops  367 587 957 140  2,051    30  27  28  25  28 
Cereal  210 508  1,062  200  1,980    17 23 31 36 27 
Vegetable  209 410  453 65  1,137    17 19 13 12 15 
Grass  175 341  489 80  1,085    14 16 14 14 15 
Pulses  146  198  224  32  600    12  9 6 6 8 
Ornamental  plants  42 40  69 5 156    3 2 2 1 2 
Roots  -  - 116  31  147    0 0 3 6 2 
Fruit  19 30  40 6 95    2 1 1 1 1 
Spices  28 30  17 1 76    2 1 0 0 1 
Tobacco  14 14  19 1 48    1 1 1 0 1 
Others  4 4 2 1 11    0  0  0  0  0 
                   
Total  1,214  2,162  3,448 562 7,386    100 100 100 100 100 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from US Plant Variety Protection Office Crop Database. 
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Table 8: CPVO Plant Breeders Rights Applications by Type of Crop, 1996-2002 
 
Species  1996  1997 1998 1999  2000 2001 2002 Total 
          
Number of Applications     ( counts)     
  Agricultural crops  365  343 404 407  406 440 415  4,104 
  Vegetable crops  123  148 214 181  244 181 177  1,833 
  Ornamental plants  834 953  1,100  1,194  1,266  1,415  1,504  10,636 
  Fruits   61  77  104  95  95 117 125 973 
  Others  2  9 13 4 2 5  1 44 
            
Total  1,385 1,530  1,835  1,881  2,013 2,158 2,222 17,590 
            
Share of Total       ( percentage)     
  Agricultural crops  26  22 22 22  20 20 19 23 
  Vegetable crops  9 10  12  10  12  8 8  10 
  Ornamental plants  60  62 60 63  63 66 68 60 
  Fruits   4  5 6 5  5 5 6 6 
  Others  0  1 1 0  0 0 0 0 
            
Total  100  100 100 100  100 100 100 100 
 
Source: CPVO (2002). 
 



















































































Figure 1:  Biotechnology Patents 
























Source: Compiled by authors from CAMBIA-IP Resource database   51 
Table 9: Share of Area Planted to Modern Varieties of Rice, Wheat, and Maize 
 
   Rice     Wheat     Maize 
Regions  1970 1983 1991    1970 1977 1990 1997      1992 1996 
   ( percentage of area planted)  
Sub-Saharan Africa  4  5  n.a.    5  22  52  66    37  46 
West Asia/North Africa  0  11  n.a.    5  18  42  66    26  n.a. 
Asia  (excluding  China) 12 48 67    42 69 88 93   42 64 
China 77  95  100    n.a.  n.a.  70  79    97  99 
Latin  America  4  28 58    11 24 82 90   49 45 
All Developing Countries  30  59  74     20  41  70  81     58  62 
 
Source:   For rice and wheat, Runge et al. (2003) based on data from Byerlee and Moya (1993), 
Byerlee (1996), Heisey, Lantican, and Dubin (1999). For maize, Morris (1998), and 
Morris (2002). 
 
Note:   n.a. indicates not available. Modern varieties of rice and wheat refer mainly to semi-

































Source: Authors based on data from James (various years).  
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Table 10: Bioengineered Cropping Patterns in the United States 
 
    1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
      (thousands of acres)     
Bioengineered acres          
Corn  3,536   9,547   22,704   26,249   19,895   19,696   26,878   31,626  
  Bt corn  1,125   6,097   15,432   20,055   14,324   13,635   17,392   19,767  
  Herbicide-tolerant  2,411   3,450   7,272   6,194   4,775   5,303   7,115   8,697  
  Stacked               -                  -                  -                  -     796   758   1,581   3,163  
          
Soybean          
  Herbicide-tolerant   4,728   12,045   32,142   41,169   40,231   50,391   55,319   59,659  
          
Cotton  2,413   3,521   5,561   11,066   9,487   10,880   9,909   10,165  
  Bt cotton  2,097   2,071   2,173   4,804   2,333   2,050   1,814   1,949  
  Herbicide-tolerant  316   1,450   3,388   6,262   4,044   4,888   5,025   4,456  
  Stacked               -                  -                  -                  -     3,110   3,784   3,071   3,759  
          
      (percentages)     
Bioengineered share          
Corn  4.4  11.9 28.1 33.9  25  26  34  40 
  Bt corn  1.4  7.6  19.1  25.9  18  18  22  25 
    Herbicide-tolerant  3  4.3  9 8 6 7 9  11 
    Stacked  0 0 0 0 1 1 2 4 
          
Soybean          
  Herbicide-tolerant   7.4  17  44.2  55.8  54  68  75  81 
          
Cotton  16.8  25.5  43  74.4  61 69 71 73 
  Bt cotton  14.6  15  16.8  32.3  15  13  13  14 
  Herbicide-tolerant  2.2  10.5  26.2  42.1  26  31  36  32 
  Stacked  0  0  0  0  20  24  22  27 
 
Source: Fernandez-Cornejo and McBride (2002) for years prior to 2000. All other years from USDA, NASS (2003).  
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Source: Authors based on data from USDA, NASS (2003) and James (2002). 
 
Note: Data represent share of respective crop acreage in each region sown to bioengineered varieties. 
 